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Killing norms softly: US targeted killing, quasi-secrecy 
and the assassination ban 
Andris Banka and Adam Quinn 
 
Introduction 
 
How does a once-forbidden practice become normal, legitimate, even routine? More 
specifically, how can those in government who desire this outcome make it so? We ask this 
question apropos of a particular case: the programme of targeted killing conceived and 
executed by the United States under the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama. In constructing an answer, we proceed as follows. First, we define targeted killing. 
Next, we survey general theory regarding how political actors accomplish normative shifts. 
Here we highlight for scrutiny the intuitively plausible idea that engineering a stable new 
normative settlement requires direct and persuasive public advocacy for any innovation in 
practice. In this framework, secrecy is an alternative to legitimating an innovation, and likely 
a counter-productive one. Using US targeted killing as a detailed case in support, we 
propose here a contrary analysis: that official secrecy, deployed in a partial form we term 
 
 
‘quasi-secrecy’, can play an instrumental role in the process of normalising potentially 
controversial shifts in practice. With the central argument thus outlined, Section 2 
concludes by providing a clear explanation of the concept of ‘quasi-secrecy’, the context for 
its deployment in this case, and some methodological reflection regarding the parameters 
and limits of what we seek to demonstrate here. 
 
Turning to the case in detail, we first establish that between 1976 and 2001, US 
administrations operated as though the executive order prohibiting assassination tightly 
constrained, and perhaps prohibited altogether, CIA operations with the direct aim of killing 
specified individuals. This prohibition was domestic in origin, stemming from the Church 
Committee’s recommended reforms of the intelligence services. Second, we establish that 
after September 2001 this prohibition was reinterpreted to permit a category of killing 
previously treated as proscribed. Facilitated by technological advance, this practice 
subsequently became frequent and routinized. While this did not constitute a total erasure 
of the norm against assassination, it did represent a substantial revision of it, and 
constriction of its scope. Third, we detail and analyse the process by which this shift in 
practice became publicly known, and via which the executive sought to legitimate it. Here 
we demonstrate the operation of ‘quasi-secrecy’ in practice, and illustrate its utility as a 
mechanism for normalising a controversial innovation. We conclude that this case provides 
proof of concept for quasi-secrecy’s viability as a strategy of legitimation, meaning that even 
if we do not suppose it was clearly and comprehensively conceived as such at the outset in 
this instance, it could be deployed as deliberate strategy in the future.  
 
 
 
 
1. Defining targeted killing (and ‘assassination’) 
 
Targeted killing, for our purposes here, means the deliberate killing of an identified 
individual, specified in advance as the target, approved by an authorised part of a 
government bureaucracy, without independent judicial process.1 The distinction between 
permissible targeted killing and ‘assassination’ – and the sustainability of such a distinction – 
is a matter of contest. In common parlance, ‘assassination’ refers to any planned, 
individually-targeted extrajudicial killing with a political or ideological rationale, especially 
where the target occupies a leadership role. In international law, the permissibility of such 
killing hinges on whether the target can legitimately be designated a combatant in war, their 
location relative to the relevant lines of battle, and whether treachery or perfidy is involved 
in the execution.2  Pre-emptive use of lethal force against individuals outside a conventional 
battlefield may be justified by appeal to the principle of self-defence. But legal scholars have 
sought to establishing criteria limiting this: The threat must be clear and imminent, not 
“distant, unviable, or merely foreseeable”.3 The individual targeted must be “actively 
involved in an imminent attack”; the killing cannot be simply punishment for past action.4 
                                                          
1
 Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,” Harvard National Security Journal, 1:3 (2010): 
148; Avery Plaw, Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill? (London: Routledge, 2008), 3; John Yoo, “Assassination or Targeted 
Killings after 9/11,” 56 New York Law School Review, no. 57 (2011): 79; Nachman Ben-Yehuda, “Gathering Dark Secrets, 
Hidden and Dirty Information” Qualitative Sociology 13, no. 4 (1990): 349. 
2
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of International Law 45:1 (2012): 249. 
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The extent of collateral damage must be weighed.5 Crucially, the government carrying out 
the killing should articulate a legal basis for its actions.6 Much remains unresolved in the 
interpretation of these criteria, however, e.g. “there is considerable debate as to how far in 
anticipation [of harm to oneself] it is legitimate to act”.7  
 
In the analysis that follows, we are always cognizant of the contested legal and 
terminological status of lethal acts targeted at individuals designated as terrorists, militants 
or ‘enemy combatants’. Such targeting is indeed distinct from plotting to kill a prominent 
figure in a foreign government, the category of act to which ‘assassination’ has historically 
been applied with least controversy. Some may consider that the possibility of drawing such 
a distinction disposes a priori of the question of how contemporary US practice is 
reconcilable with the assassination ban: the killings it has carried out did not violate the ban 
because they are not assassinations. Importantly, we need not adjudicate the objective 
merits of this proposition in order to fulfil our intended purpose here. We need only note 
that to presume its truth is to beg a question that is contestable and contested.8 It was 
precisely the goal of the executive, during our period of focus here, to achieve acceptance 
as unproblematic for a practice that for the previous two and a half decades had been 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
but-are-they-wise-policy ; Howard A. Wachtel, “Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of Assassination as a 
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22; Ward Thomas, “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination,” International Security 25:1 (2000): 105-
133; Betcy Jose, “The Trouble With Targeted Killings: The Rise and Fall of an International Norm,” Foreign Affairs, 
September 12, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2014-09-12/trouble- targeted-killings 
 
 
treated as prohibited.  We are concerned here not with the intellectual or moral correctness 
of that project, only with the process via which it successfully unfolded.   
 
 
2. Theorising normative shifts 
 
2.1 Norm establishment and erosion 
 
The established definition of norms in the literature is “collective expectations for the 
proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”.9 Broadly speaking, norms serve as “rules 
of the road”.10 They tell us “what the playing board will look like, and which moves are 
acceptable”.11 Norms, when established, may be violated, but this carries a price for the 
violator and thus they shape behaviour.12 A rich body of scholarship documents instances of 
norm-building, diffusion, and socialization.13 Instances of norm-weakening have also been 
charted (though studies of this are somewhat less numerous).14 
                                                          
9
 Peter J. Katzenstein et al., eds. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 5.  
10
 Carmen Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” in Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: 
Interests, Conflicts, and Justice, ed. Harlad Muller and Carmen Wunderlich (London: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 22.  
11
 Gregory A. Raymond, “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms,” Mershon International Studies 
Review 41:2 (1997): 215.  
12
 Katzenstein, “The Culture,” 118; Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: CUP, 2007); Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in 
International Society,” International Organization 44:4. (1990): 479-526. 
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 Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition”; Ann Florini, “The evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 
40:3 (1996): 363-389; Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society (Oxford: OUP, 2007); Amitav Acharya, “How 
Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International 
Organization 58:2 (2004): 239-275; Rodger A. Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,” European Journal of 
International Relations 7:1 (2001): 37–61. 
14
 Ryder McKeown, “Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm,” International Relations 23:5 
(2009): 5-25; Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” European Journal of 
 
 
 
The “norm life cycle” model, introduced by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), provides the 
archetypal framework for norm establishment: a norm is first proposed by an entrepreneur, 
then achieves broad acceptance from a critical mass of actors, and finally is widely 
internalized such that “conformance…is almost automatic”.15 McKeown (2009) modelled 
the reverse process in the “norm death series”. Here, revisionists first challenge a widely-
internalized norm through “quiet changes in policy away from compliance”.16 Struggle then 
occurs “both in public discourse and within government institutions”. Should the change 
achieve widespread acceptance, the norm suffers a crisis of legitimacy and may expire.17 
Several scholars note that major events – war, revolution, economic crisis – may trigger or 
accelerate such shifts.18 
 
Our analysis here takes McKeown’s model as its starting point, with a slight adjustment to 
level of analysis. The prohibition on assassination is of domestic American rather than 
international origin, brought into being – as we shall discuss later – by the Church 
Committee enquiry and reforms in the 1970s. This does not, however, present a conceptual 
obstacle to adopting the basic architecture of conventional norm theory: as Finnemore and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Relations, (2011): 1-24; Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Redefining the Nonproliferation Norm? Australian Uranium, the 
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“Contesting the International Illegitimacy of Torture: The Bush Administration’s Failure to Legitimate its Preferences within 
International Society,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2013): 1-27.  
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 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 
52:4 (1998): 904.  
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 McKeown, “Norm Regress,” 11.  
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 McKeown, “Norm Regress,” 12.  
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 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm”; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “When Norms Clash: International 
Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan's Internalisation of the GATT/WTO,” Review of International Studies 31:1 (2005): 3-
25; Andrew P. Cortell and Sysan Peterson, “Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change,” British Journal of 
Political Science 29, no. 1 (1999): 188; Deborah Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the 
Practice of War,” International Organization 54:1 (2000): 49.  
 
 
Sikkink19 and Sandholtz20 note, it is readily transferable between levels. It requires only 
minor alteration, to the identity-content of the model’s components. In our case here the 
executive is the initiating agent of change, rather than the US Government in its totality, 
while the primary audience for legitimation efforts is not the global public or international 
institutions, but the American public, and domestic institutions such as Congress and the 
courts. 
 
 
2.2. Strategies of legitimation 
 
A norm is a bearer of legitimacy.21 This cannot be bestowed unilaterally; its existence 
presupposes a community “able to pass judgment on appropriateness”.22 Actors sometimes 
choose to defect from established rules, but even powerful actors are “limited in the costs 
they can tolerate” and will therefore seek to ground their actions in some claim to 
legitimacy.23 Keating provides a typology of strategies available to an actor engaged in 
behaviour that transgresses against established normative standards.24  It posits four 
alternatives. The first is to act openly in violation of the existing norm without any 
accompanying effort at justification. If the norm is well-established, however, this can only 
be temporary, since others will demand explanation for norm-violating behaviour, and 
                                                          
19
 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm,” 893;  
20
 Wayne Sandholtz, “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules against Wartime Plunder,” European Journal of 
International Relations, 14:1 (2008): 104.  
21
 Florini, “The evolution,” 365.  
22
 Thomas Risse et al., eds. The Power of Human Rights International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 
7; Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” International Politics 44: 2 (2007): 159; Martha Finnemore, 
“Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity, World Politics, 61:1(2009): 61.   
23
 Alex J. Bellamy, Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 31.  
24
 Keating, “Contesting,” 6.  
 
 
transgression against an established norm, by definition, carries cost. The second strategy is 
overt justification: to acknowledge the action, but claim that one remains compliant with 
the norm. This will likely involve some creative re-description of either the requirements of 
the norm or the characteristics of the action taken. The third strategy is overt innovation. In 
this case, an actor openly and actively advocates amending or overturning the established 
norm to render their actions permissible.  
 
Finally, there is secrecy. In this case, the actor conceals, and denies the existence of, norm-
breaking behaviour.  This strategy does not seek to justify actions or advocate for the 
amendment norms, but to evade the need for legitimation. Secrecy is conventionally framed 
as an undesirable resort, to be employed when an actor does not believe they can 
successfully publicly defend their actions.25 Hurd contends that secrecy is a high-risk 
strategy that can only be a temporary measure.26 Byman is also critical of secrecy, arguing 
that without transparency and the resulting public debate, “a policy can be held hostage to 
perfection. If policies are not endorsed beforehand by the public and the political 
opposition, they will provoke intense controversy when abuses and mistakes occur—as they 
inevitably will.” 27 
 
 
2.3. Introducing ‘quasi-secrecy’ 
                                                          
25
 Justin Morris, et al., eds. The Rise and Fall of Norms in International Politics (Aberystwyth: International Security and 
Institutions Research Group, 2009), 5.  
26
 Ian Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy,” International Politics, 44 (2007): 
210.  
27
 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2. (2006): 109.  
 
 
 
 
Building on Keating, our proposition here, supported by analysis of the case, is that although 
secrecy may sometimes be a temporary, counterposed and counterproductive alternative to 
legitimation, it is misconceived to think of it exclusively, or even primarily, in this way. We 
contend the case of US targeted killing demonstrates that, on the contrary, when official 
secrecy and de facto public disclosure are combined – a phenomenon we term ‘quasi-
secrecy’ – this can provide a quite effective mechanism for normalizing controversial 
practice. In order that the purpose of the detailed case analysis to follow be maximally clear, 
in this section we briefly summarise how and why quasi-secrecy took shape in this case, and 
present in outline form a conceptual model for its operation that we derive from this. 
 
The basic fact that the US Government was killing individuals in on foreign soil using a new, 
remotely-controlled technology was known and publicly reported from almost the moment 
it commenced. The first operational instalment of the post-9/11 targeted killing programme, 
in Yemen in 2002, was accompanied by a single, under-considered instance of public 
disclosure by a US official (see Section 4 for details). The practice itself was therefore not, de 
facto, a secret for long. Yet, after that moment of initial confusion, it proceeded for years 
under a blanket of official secrecy. On grounds of national security, officials refused to 
confirm even rudimentary facts, and declined to publicly articulate any reasoning 
reconciling the practice with established law and norms. Indeed, the programme’s very 
existence remained highly classified. 
 
 
 
This served two functions for the executive. The first was to restrict access to official 
operational data, such as number of strikes, targets and casualties. Such information would 
be steadily and painstakingly assembled in parallel through the investigative efforts of 
journalists, researchers and others. But official non-acknowledgement of these facts lifted 
any obligation from government officials to engage publicly with potentially uncomfortable 
questions regarding collateral damage, cost-benefit analysis, etc. The second function was 
to obviate the need to publicly articulate the legal basis upon which the policy rested. This 
curtailed the possibility of pressing officials, on the record, as to the logical implications of 
that legal reasoning, most especially the key question of where – if anywhere – it located 
the outer limit of the executive’s asserted prerogative to kill.  
 
Over time, the Obama administration gradually loosened the secrecy governing the 
programme in both regards, i.e. operational facts and legal reasoning. This came first 
through strategic leaks. The aim of these was to make it publicly known that the 
administration was pursuing a major, pro-active counterterrorist programme, and to portray 
it in the most favourable possible light. This allowed the administration to claim credit for 
taking effective action, while at the same time retaining in place a shield against critical 
interrogation of the programme as a whole. Later, the ground having been thus laid, the 
administration did open up officially, to a limited extent, regarding both operational facts 
and legal basis. This allowed it to claim a belated good faith effort at openness and 
accountability; indeed, it may have reflected the reality of such good faith. In doing so, 
however, it retained a regime of classification sufficient to allow (a) selective 
acknowledgement or denial of operational facts at its own discretion, and (b) curtailment, at 
 
 
the point of its own choosing, of official engagement with discussion of the programme’s 
legal implications.   
 
The result was a regime of quasi-secrecy: the coexistence over an extended period of official 
secrecy and de facto public disclosure regarding an ongoing practice. This allowed relevant 
audiences, including the public, to grow accustomed to the programme’s existence through 
regular references in the news media and wider culture. At the same time, it contained the 
risk of focused controversy and backlash to levels lower than would be entailed in full 
disclosure and direct, uninhibited advocacy for a new normative dispensation.  
 
The Bush and, more so, Obama administrations did engage in justification of their actions up 
to a point. But official secrecy was not an alternative to such efforts at legitimation – it was 
complementary to it. By declining to avow all operational facts, or present with total 
transparency its claim to a new legal authority of specifiable scope and basis, the executive 
deprived those who would oppose its actions of two things vital to engaging in a public 
contest of ideas through the political system: mutually-acknowledged data, and 
authoritative official interlocutors. And yet: there is no evidence that this was ultimately 
counterproductive. On the contrary, when official figures for drone strikes and civilian 
casualties were finally released, in the final year of Obama’s presidency, they generated 
little reaction. A major reason for this, we would contend, was that those receiving this 
‘new’ information did not perceive it as such.  Having been ambiently aware for years 
already of targeted killing and drone strikes, a non-expert member of the public might 
reasonably – if incorrectly – have supposed the information finally being provided for the 
 
 
first time to have been officially acknowledged long before. Likewise, a reasonable person 
might in 2016 suppose it far too late, and therefore redundant, to seek to open discussion 
regarding the legal and normative implications of targeted killing; surely such issues must 
have been debated and resolved via the proper forums and channels at the appropriate, 
considerably earlier, time? We discuss this further in the section 6. 
 
We should be clear that the realistic objective of any effort to legitimate controversial new 
practice is not universal support. In our case here, the key domestic audiences were the 
public, Congress, and the judicial establishment, i.e. those among whom majority opposition 
could materially impede the executive’s ability to continue with the targeted killing 
programme. Some elements of society were highly unlikely ever to be persuaded of the 
legitimacy of targeted killing: human and civil rights organisations; liberal lawyers; 
longstanding critics of expansive executive war powers on both the political left and right. 
Resistance from such irreconcilables being a given from the outset, the objective for the 
executive was to prevent the foreseeable opposition of these elite constituencies from 
gaining wider purchase among higher-priority audiences. A secrecy-sceptical model of 
legitimation would warn that failure to be transparent at the outset and engage in overt 
persuasive advocacy for a new normative settlement would prove counterproductive in this 
regard. We would contend, however, that in this case, while secrecy and quasi-secrecy may 
have frustrated – and continues to frustrate – such elite groups, it did not demonstrably 
impede the executive in ultimately securing and maintaining the consent of its priority 
audiences.    
 
 
 
To abstract to the general conceptual level: the model for normalisation via quasi-secrecy 
that we posit here has four stages. First, policy changes to permit acts previously prohibited, 
and this is kept secret. Second, credible reports of the new practice come in from the field 
and are published, but the executive adopts a blanket stance of refusing to confirm or deny 
their veracity. Third, the executive itself becomes a source of public information about the 
practice, via leaks designed to portray it favourably, but continues to maintain official 
secrecy across the board. Fourth, if the previous stages unfold without generating sufficient 
opposition to force reconsideration, the executive publicly avows the new practice, and may 
also present on the record selected facts and justificatory arguments. This should not be 
confused with total transparency, however: a significant level of official secrecy may be 
retained, and may continue indefinitely.  
 
Finally, a note on context: the success of any legitimation effort is contingent at least to 
some degree on the conduciveness of the circumstances in which it takes place. Our focus in 
this article is on formal US policy, and the actions and statements of government officials. 
But the events described should be viewed in the light of a substantial scholarly literature 
on the wider cultural and historical context in which the events analysed here occurred. 
Carvin and Williams have insightfully located twenty-first century American targeted killing 
within a longstanding national project to craft a “legal-scientific way of warfare that… seeks 
to balance the need to employ overwhelming force with legal and humanitarian concerns 
through science and technology”.28 Other scholars similarly remind us that contemporary US 
actions are situated within longer-term patterns of development in both liberal-democratic 
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 Stephanie Carvin and Michael John Williams, Law, Science, Liberalism and the American Way of Warfare, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2015), p.19 
 
 
and legal norms29, and the technologies of targeting and violence.30  Additionally, we might 
posit some more immediate factors that made quasi-secret targeted killing by the US after 
2001 possible. These include: the inaccessible locations where most strikes took place, 
making independent reporting difficult; the CIA’s standing authority to carry out deniable 
covert operations at the instruction of the president, and therefore its ready suitability to 
serve as the agent of such a programme; and the disproportionate international power of 
the US, which afforded it latitude to brush off outside enquiries about its conduct, e.g. from 
the United Nations.  
 
 
 
 
2.4 Reflections on methodology, case selection, sources 
 
Our claims in this article should be viewed within the following parameters. It is a starting 
premise that the practice of targeted killing has been successfully normalised and 
legitimated within the American polity. It is therefore not a primary task of this article to 
substantiate this fact, but we do provide support for it in Section 6, citing public opinion 
data and acceptance of the executive’s practice by Congress and the courts. Rather, our 
                                                          
29
 Kyle Grayson, Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing: On drones, counter-insurgency and violence (Abingdon 
and New York: Routledge, 2016); Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig, ‘Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of 
democratic warfare?’, Security Dialogue, 43:4, 2012, pp.363-380; Craig A. Jones, ‘Lawfare and the 
juridification of late modern war’, Progress in Human Geography, 40:2, 2016, pp.221–239 
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drone technology’, Security Dialogue, 47:3, 2016, pp.223–238; Ian Graham Ronald Shaw and Majed Akhter 
‘The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan’, Antipode 44:4 2012, pp.1490–1509. 
 
 
overriding focus is on the process by which normalization was achieved. In methodological 
terms, the case evidence and analysis presented here fulfils two functions. First, it serves to 
falsify two potential hypotheses, closely related to one another: (a) that secrecy is an 
oppositional alternative to seeking and obtaining legitimacy for a normative innovation; and 
(b) that secrecy is always counterproductive to achieving that end.31 To put it another way, 
this case is shown to be a non-congruent counterexample with regard to these 
propositions.32  The case’s second function is to provide an initial probe of the coherence 
and plausibility of the proposition that what we call ‘quasi-secrecy’ can serve as a 
mechanism facilitating normalization. This is demonstrated via historical process-tracing of 
how US practice shifted and how that shift was accounted for publicly. Our findings here 
provide, we would contend, sufficient grounds for further pursuit of this line of inquiry in 
future research. 
 
Focus on the case of US targeted killing can be justified by reference to two considerations. 
First, the unusually explicit status of the prior prohibition in the United States. All states are 
in principle governed by the same international restraints regarding killing. But the existence 
of an explicit order banning assassination, interpreted before 2001 as tightly constraining 
the kind of targeted killing pursued on large scale thereafter, meant the American executive 
faced a more acute challenge than others might have when seeking legitimacy for its actions 
in the eyes of domestic audiences. Second, the scale of the US programme, and 
consequently the lack of ambiguity as to whether a major shift took place. A small number 
                                                          
31
 On the validity of using single cases to contradict hypotheses, so long as the case is well-suited as a test of claim, see 
Ronald Rogowski, “The role of theory and anomaly in social-scientific inference,” American Political Science Review 89:2 
(1995).  
32
 On congruence, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 181-284.  
 
 
of other states – including Israel, the UK and France – engaged in similar lethal actions 
during the same period. However, the US has carried out by far the largest number of 
targeted killings and drone strikes. The sheer size of the American programme, combined 
with its systematic and institutionalised character, which we discuss in Section 6, eliminates 
scope for any plausible claim that killings in this period represented merely rare anomalous 
exceptions to a still-standing general prohibition.  
 
The sources available for use in this enquiry vary by period. Our portrayal of the Church 
Committee era, when the ban on assassination was established, can be grounded fully in 
archival sources that include declassified materials from the National Security Archive and 
the Ford Presidential Library. For later periods, where classification remains in fuller force, 
the official record is necessarily less complete. Nevertheless, using a combination of public 
documents, memoirs, and secondary sources based on interviews with participants, it is 
possible to construct a robust account of how and when practices changed. The account 
provided here of official acknowledgement of the post-2001 targeted killing programme by 
the executive, i.e. what was disclosed publicly and when regarding operations and their 
legal basis, is based on a comprehensive survey of officially available speeches, press 
conferences, hearings, Congressional debates, legal documents, and published interviews 
from the period. The account of parallel disclosure-by-leak is likewise grounded in a 
comprehensive survey of contemporary print media. 
 
 
 
For some kinds of enquiry into a practice such as targeted killing, high levels of government 
secrecy might present a major obstacle.33 The gap between what is ‘known’ about the 
practice through indirect reportage and what is officially avowed has been a source of 
frustration even to those with relatively strong claims to rightful access to information. 
Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
complained in 2011 of “an almost surreal tendency on the part of the executive and the 
courts to pretend that information that has been comprehensively leaked, remains 
unknown or at least uncognizable”.34 Fortunately for our purposes here, it is precisely this 
disjunction between facts widely known and those officially acknowledged that is of 
interest. We do not claim to uncover here new data regarding US covert practice. For the 
underlying facts of the targeted killing programme, we draw upon on the deep reservoir of 
reportage already assembled on the public record. The significance of our contribution lies 
rather in analysis of how quasi-secrecy served the executive’s interest in its normalization. 
 
It is important to specify some claims we do not make. First, we do not propose that quasi-
secrecy was the only mechanism by which normalization could possibly have been 
successfully achieved. We contend only that it was the mechanism by which it occurred in 
this instance, and that this success is suggestive of its viability and potential utility as such. 
Second, we do not maintain that quasi-secrecy was a singular, coherently-conceived and 
deliberately pursued strategy on the part of the Bush or Obama administrations. As the case 
detail will demonstrate, more than one factor contributed to bringing about the blend of 
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simultaneous classification and disclosure: the demands of foreign governments to obscure 
their complicity; prudential concern for restricting sensitive operational detail; the desire to 
win public credit for effective counterterrorist measures; and, perhaps, sincere commitment 
to some degree of transparency and accountability. Our claim is that whether conceived as 
a deliberate whole or simply the product of a synthesis of competing pressures, the ultimate 
de facto strategy of quasi-secrecy proved a highly effective mechanism for achieving 
normalization of a controversial innovation. We propose that this should be considered 
initial proof of concept for quasi-secrecy as a strategy that might be deliberately adopted by 
future administrations in analogous circumstances.    
 
3. The prohibition at maximum force: 1976-2001 
 
3.1 Establishment of the norm against assassination 
 
The origins of the prohibition on US Government deployment of assassination lie in 
domestic pressures and processes. Specifically, it resulted from the Church Committee 
investigation into “illegal, improper, or unethical” activities on the part of the intelligence 
services.35 Despite the Ford administration’s public position that it would provide 
“maximum assistance”36, the committee faced resistance throughout, first to its full access 
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to intelligence materials,37 then to the public release of its report.38 That report condemned 
US use of assassination as immoral, logistically precarious, and liable to be 
counterproductive.39 It also noted that “a system which relies on secrecy” created the “risk 
of confusion and rashness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment were most 
necessary”.40  
 
The committee favoured an assassination ban written into statute,41 but the ultimate result 
was a compromise short of that: an executive order issued on February 18, 1976.42 The 
order did not define ‘assassination’, with the result that the scope of the prohibition has 
been contested ever since, among both scholars and officials. Some argue this ambiguity 
was deliberate, engineered to preserve the option of narrow interpretation.43 Others 
contend that it barred the US government “from directing, facilitating, encouraging, or even 
incidentally causing the killing of any specified individual”.44 During the period 1976-2001, 
the assassination ban served as a strong constraining influence on US action.  It came under 
strain from two sources. The first is of lesser importance for our purposes: the provocation 
of dictators such as Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Panama’s Manuel 
Noriega. These have received extended consideration elsewhere, but we do not discuss 
them here because targeting heads of state entails the most unambiguous possible violation 
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of the assassination ban, and thus its consideration raised issues distinct from the post-9/11 
targeted killing programme. Our focus is the second source of strain: terrorism and militancy 
emerging from the Middle East. This invited the US Government to narrow its interpretation 
of the ban, to permit targeting terroristic non-state actors. Two examples from the period 
merit detailed attention, and we treat them individually below. Importantly, neither led to 
the prohibition on targeting and killing individuals being set aside; on the contrary, they 
evidence its continuing force. However, they did see the first private articulation of legal 
rationales that would become relevant in the post-9/11 period, making them important 
precursors to practices later to come. 
 
3.2 The Reagan administration and Lebanese hit squads 
 
The Reagan administration came close to carrying out targeted killings in Lebanon, in 
reaction to the threat posed by militant Islamist groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. 
This began with a secret proposal from National Security Council official Oliver North, in 
spring 1984, to covertly contract local teams to eliminate those responsible for bombing US 
facilities.45 Stanley Sporkin, General Counsel to the CIA, privately argued that legal basis for 
such action could be found in self-defence, and that it was possible to draw a robust legal 
distinction between the proposed action and killings of the kind carried out prior to Church 
and prohibited after 1976.46 This received firm pushback from the CIA, whose leadership 
personally recalled the reputational damage brought to the agency by the Church 
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revelations; CIA Director Richard Helms and his deputy John McMahon believed the 
proposal violated the assassination ban.47 In summer 1985, through a task force on 
counterterrorism strategy under Vice President Bush, officials engaged in formal discussion 
for the first time of adopting a narrow interpretation of the ban’s scope that excluded 
terrorists.48 Despite the CIA’s objections, Reagan initially approved the Lebanon proposal: 
he secretly issued presidential findings (i.e. directives) clearing the legal path for the plan, 
and approximately $1 million was allocated for training and support.49 
 
The US aborted the plan, however, when a prospective Lebanese ‘contractor’ carried out an 
unapproved car bombing, killing 80 and wounding 200.50 The presidential findings were also 
rescinded, though at the same time as White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater 
acknowledged this he denied they had involved any authorisation of assassination, 
something Vice President Bush stated publicly would be “absolutely criminal”.51 Anonymous 
officials would later tell the Washington Post that the orders of the president had been 
intended to circumvent the existing bar on assassinations.52 This led White House reporter 
Helen Thomas to directly ask: “Mr. President, did you sign two orders, directive intelligence 
orders, which appeared to circumvent the assassination directive – ban on assassinations?” 
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Reagan denied he had ever issued a “permit to assassinate anyone in any of the things that 
we were doing”.53 
 
After leaving office, Reagan would admit that targeting killing had been considered, but 
claim he had ultimately decided it was a “game that America couldn’t and didn’t play”.54 
Robert Oakley, State Department counterterrorism coordinator under Reagan, later recalled 
there was “a great debate about whether or not one could do this, and a lot of the laws and 
regulations and executive orders were studied very, very carefully”.55 There were 
“differences of opinion within the executive branch”, but in the final analysis the president 
decided, "no, we are not going to go that route”.56 In light of the role new technology would 
play later, it is worth underscoring that this decision was heavily influenced by practical 
concerns regarding the likelihood of successful execution, not just internal resistance on 
legal and normative grounds.  
 
 
3.3 The Clinton administration and Osama bin Laden  
 
Until 1998, Osama bin Laden, though monitored by the CIA, was perceived as a “low 
priority” threat.57 This changed in 1998 after the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, which killed hundreds. Following this, President Clinton signed a presidential 
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finding authorizing covert action to capture bin Laden, and to kill him if he resisted. Clinton 
would later amend the secret memorandum of understanding setting parameters for the 
operation a number of times: first expanding the list of permitted targets beyond bin Laden 
to include a small number of key lieutenants, and later authorizing shooting down any 
aircraft or helicopter he might use to try to escape Afghanistan.58 Richard Clarke, Clinton’s 
counterterrorism head, notes that because of its unwillingness to approve a straightforward 
killing, the administration produced a series of unusual documents that gave “extremely 
specific authorities for particular CIA operations aimed at bin Laden”.59 According to Clarke, 
“there was concern in both the Justice Department and in some elements of the White 
House and some elements of the CIA that we not create an American hit-list that would 
become an ongoing institution that we could just keep adding names to and have hit teams 
go out and assassinate people”.60 
 
Investigative reporter Jeremy Scahill, who has had access to many of the Clinton-era 
national security files, notes the baroque quality of the order: “The authorization for killing 
bin Laden was built in a way that there almost was one scenario where he could be killed – 
when he was in certain kind of a house, with a particular brand of lock on the door and only 
then you can strike the house”.61 According to CIA Director George Tenet, “almost every 
authority granted to CIA prior to 9/11 made it clear that just going out and assassinating Bin 
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Laden would not have been permissible or acceptable”.62 Years later, during 9/11 
Commission hearings, CIA officials and lawyers uniformly said that they had interpreted 
authorities signed by Clinton as instructing them to try to capture Bin Laden alive, and that 
the only acceptable context for killing him would be during a credible operation aimed at 
capture.63 Two senior CIA officers later said they would have been “morally and practically 
opposed to getting CIA into what might look like an assassination.” One went so far as to say 
he would have “refused an order to directly kill Bin Laden.”64 
 
 
4. The Bush administration after 9/11: a covert shift 
 
4.1 Narrowing the scope of the prohibition 
 
Before 9/11 only one country, Israel, engaged programmatically in targeted killing, and it 
was criticized by the United States for doing so.65 In July 2001, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell said of Israel’s targeted hits: “We…express our distress and opposition to these kinds 
of targeted killings and we will continue to do so”.66 US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk 
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stated: “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted 
assassinations”.67 
 
In 9/11’s aftermath, however, many criticised the legacy of Church for having neutered the 
US intelligence community’s capabilities, including Paul Bremer, Chairman of the bipartisan 
National Commission on Terrorism, and Henry Kissinger.68 Former Secretary of State James 
Baker openly endorsed revoking the assassination ban.69  Former president Bush said there 
was a need to “free up the intelligence system from some of its constraints”.70 Within 
government, several senior figures made statements about the need to revisit restrictions 
on covert operations, including Vice President Cheney,71 Secretary of State Powell,72 
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Bob Graham,73 and Vice-Chairman Richard 
Shelby.74  A former CIA official observed that in the post-9/11 environment there was a 
feeling that “the things we couldn’t do before, now we can do them”.75 Georgia 
Congressman Bob Barr even made a formal proposal to overturn “those portions of 
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executive orders purporting to prohibit the government from directly eliminating terrorist 
leaders”.76 This secured 14 co-sponsors, though it ultimately went no further.77 
 
This drew some public resistance from figures such as Chair of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Lee Hamilton,78 former CIA director and later Secretary of Defence Robert 
Gates79 and Democratic senator Christopher Dodd.80 Outside government, NGOs and 
international lawyers argued for preserving pre-9/11 standards. Human Rights Watch sent a 
letter to President Bush urging that the United States should remain committed to 
“investigation, arrest, trial and punishment,” not “executions or targeting non-
combatants”.81 Cherif Bassiouni, an eminent scholar of international criminal law, warned 
against having “the intelligence agencies be judge, jury and executioner all wrapped into 
one. The potential for abuse is too big and the symbolism is too harmful”.82 
 
In the event, there would be no open declaration that the restrictions governing targeted 
killing had narrowed. Rather, there was simply shift in practice, authorized and executed 
secretly. As Ulrich (2014) notes, the president may legally amend or revoke an executive 
order without “publicly disclosing that he has done so”.83 During NSC meetings after 9/11, 
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President Bush reportedly requested a scorecard: a list of top al-Qaeda members, to be 
crossed out after their elimination.84 According to Richard Clarke, Bush told staff on the day 
of the attacks: “Everything is available for the pursuit of this war. Any barriers in your way, 
they’re gone”.85 CIA headquarters would become the hub for counterterrorism operations. 
Bob Woodward reported a senior official in 2001 as stating, vaguely but ominously: “The 
president has given the Agency the green light to do whatever is necessary. The gloves are 
off. Lethal operations that were unthinkable pre-September 11 are now underway”.86  
 
A landmark moment came on September 15, at a strategy meeting of Bush’s national 
security team at Camp David, when CIA Director George Tenet put forward a plan to hunt 
and kill al-Qaeda members and associated forces, without geographical limitation.87 John 
Rizzo, a CIA lawyer involved in drafting the proposal, later commented he had “never seen a 
presidential authorization as far-reaching and as aggressive in scope”.88  According to John 
Radsan the Assistant General Counsel of the CIA, the authorization was “generally worded”, 
amounting to: “Go out and get the bad guys. Disrupt them, kill them, interrogate them”.89 
Banks characterises the authority transferred to the CIA as the “most sweeping and most 
lethal” since the agency’s creation.90 A decade later, President Bush would acknowledge 
having granted broad authority to the CIA for covert actions, including “permission to kill Al 
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Qaeda operatives”,91 something he knew to be “a significant departure from America’s 
policies over the past two decades”.92 
 
Following this authorization, instructions cascaded through the national security agencies. 
Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, reportedly briefed his team as follows on 
September 19th: “I want to give you your marching orders, and I want to make them very 
clear. I have discussed this with the President and he is in full agreement... I don’t want bin 
Laden and his thugs captured, I want them dead... They must be killed. I want to see photos 
of their heads on pikes. I want bin Laden’s head shipped back in a box filled with dry ice”.93 
Gary Schroen, in charge of the subsequent CIA incursion into Afghanistan, later recalled that 
it was the first time he had received an order to kill rather than seek to capture a target.94 
The CIA prepared a list of about “two dozen terrorist leaders” who could now could be 
targeted and killed.95 Tenet requested and received additional authorization for the CIA to 
add further names to this list without further presidential approval.96 In terms of both 
operational substance and oversight, this represented a major rollback of key elements of 
the Church reforms.97  
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The first targeted strike outside a conventional battlefield took place in Yemen, on 
November 3rd, 2002, killing Qaed Salim Sinan Al-Harethi, a high-level al-Qaeda operative, 
and five others.98 The president was not asked to authorize the specific strike; it was 
approved by “senior officials” in the CIA and military using the authority delegated to 
them.99 The event also served, in a backward sort of way, to underscore the imperative for 
secrecy. In the immediate aftermath of the strike, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul 
Wolfowitz took a celebratory public stance, praising the strike on CNN as “very successful 
tactical operation… One hopes each time you get a success like that, not only to have gotten 
rid of somebody dangerous, but to have imposed changes in their tactics and operations”.100 
Unwittingly, Wolfowitz triggered a diplomatic crisis with his remarks: the Yemeni 
government had agreed with Washington that it would claim responsibility and did not 
receive this surprise reversal well.101 After this singular initial misstep, however, a wall of 
official secrecy descended. It would be almost a decade before any high-level government 
official would next comment on the record regarding a targeted killing. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Technological change as driver and enabler   
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Unmanned aerial vehicles (‘drones’) were first used in non-armed form during the Balkan 
crisis of 1995.102 The idea of using them as a tool for targeted killing emerged gradually 
during the Clinton years. A CIA drone in 1999 spotted bin Laden in Afghanistan, but the five-
hour preparation time required by the Pentagon to organise a missile strike allowed him to 
escape.103 Following this, the project of arming drones, with Hellfire missiles, was put on 
fast-track. Initially, the CIA was opposed; just a week before 9/11, Director Tenet was 
quoted saying it would be “a terrible mistake” for the agency to take on this operational 
role.104 This immediately changed with 9/11. In his Sep 15 Camp David presentation, Tenet 
briefed administration officials for the first time on armed drones.105 The first armed drone 
mission took place in Afghanistan on October 7.106 
 
The drone strike programme during the Bush administration started slowly, with just a few 
strikes against high-level targets. Following the first, President Bush was sufficiently 
impressed to ask: “Why do we fly only one Predator at a time, we ought to have fifty of 
these things”.107 But the second took place only in the summer of 2004, in Pakistan, 
targeting Taliban leader Nek Mohammad. Per agreement with Washington, the Pakistani 
government claimed responsibility, denying American involvement as “absolutely 
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absurd”.108 The campaign had gathered pace towards the end of Bush’s time in office, 
however. By one account, the administration authorized 36 strikes in its final year, having 
carried out just nine (outside military combat) in all previous years.109 Some targets were 
high-level Al-Qaeda figures, such as Ayman Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; others 
were unknown to the wider public. According to Long War Journal, Bush authorized 46 
drone strikes during his term in office.110 The New America Foundation put the count at 48, 
with an estimated 205-350 deaths resulting.111 Official secrecy meant the administration 
refused to provide its own numbers.  
 
A link between technological innovation and normative change has previously been noted 
by several scholars.112 If the US had not acquired armed drone capabilities, targeted killings 
would still have been part of the ‘war on terror’; prior to expansion of the drone 
programme, special forces and private contractors had been directed to prepare for such 
missions. But logistical difficulty and associated risk had been a discouraging factor in 
previous administrations’ consideration of plots to kill. Drone technology altered this 
calculus, increasing the confidence with which policymakers could expect targeted killing 
operations to achieve their objectives at acceptable risk and cost. By so doing it incentivized 
a more permissive interpretation of rules constraining such action. 
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The development of drone technology was a double-edged sword when it came to 
maintaining secrecy. On the one hand, by protecting US personnel from physical jeopardy, 
drones eliminated the need to account for American casualties in the field should things go 
wrong, a common trigger for forced disclosure of violent overseas operations. On the other 
hand, although the technology made it easier to keep any single strike secret, it incentivised 
an increase in their number and frequency that made public reportage, and thus ultimate 
disclosure of the programme, more likely. Once disclosure did take place, however, 
technology was broadly helpful to the executive’s need to keep domestic audiences on-side. 
By removing loss of American lives from among the possible liabilities of targeted killing 
operations, it removed one major prudential reason for opposing them. In addition, it 
provided some basis in fact for claiming that the US could strike targets with 
unprecedentedly high precision and low collateral damage. This might ease the concerns of 
those concerned primarily with effectiveness or with civilian casualties.  
 
 
4.3 The legal basis  
 
The administration’s shift in practice raised important questions as to the legal basis on 
which it was proceeding. Gary Solis, a law professor at West Point, believed that the first 
targeted killings were a precedent-setting event: “Until just a few months ago, we would all 
have expressed abhorrence [...] of targeting individuals off the battlefield… But now…we are 
 
 
taking a new approach”.113 Amnesty International (2005) pointed out that the United States 
had historically condemned such actions.114 For its strikes to be carried out, the Bush 
administration was required to craft legal findings internally to the effect that they were 
permissible. With the exception of Wolfowitz’s gaffe, however, the targeted killing 
programme went entirely unacknowledged officially for the duration of the Bush 
presidency. The administration did not publicly proffer any legal basis for its actions. It was 
therefore unclear as a matter of public record whether the executive order banning 
assassination had been, in any formal way, amended.  
 
Despite the absence of official statement, however, the outline of the legal interpretations 
supporting the new policy, and reconciling it with existing rules, did begin to take shape in 
media coverage and subsequent discussion within the legal community.115 The foundation 
of the administration’s legal case was the sweeping authority of the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force,116 passed one week after 9/11 with only a single member of Congress 
opposed. This was ground-breaking in empowering the president to target non-state actors 
“even to the individual level,”117 and shifting counterterrorism from a criminal justice 
framework to a “war” paradigm, in which terrorists could be designated ‘enemy 
combatants.’ This facilitated invoking self-defence as grounds for use of lethal force,118 
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buttressed by an expansive interpretation of the concept of ‘imminence’ as it pertained to 
terrorist threats. The administration’s National Security Strategy, published in 2002, 
asserted that the US needed to “adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today’s adversaries”.119  
 
One administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, later explained that this 
legal framework was crafted precisely because the administration did not wish to simply 
rescind the assassination ban: “The self-defense exemption was a legal fabrication to save 
face, to say, Yes, it still applies, but just not in these cases”.120 Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage later recalled that President Bush issued a further order in early 2002, 
supplementing his earlier authorisation of the CIA’s targeting programme: “I don’t recall 
necessarily the words, ‘targeted killings’, but it was clearly that. It was loosening the 
Executive Order 12333 against assassinations. And the reasoning as I recall was, its wartime, 
it’s not an assassination, its war”.121  Robert Grenier, the CIA’s leading counter-terrorism 
official during this period, would later acknowledge that a significant shift in legal 
interpretation had taken place: “Activities that before 9/11 we would have said were 
assassination – now we are simply exercising our sovereign right of self-defence”.122 
 
 
4.4 Secrecy as alternative to justification or overt innovation 
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Excepting the Wolfowitz ‘moment’ in November 2002, the Bush administration, unlike its 
successor, committed fully to official secrecy regarding the targeted killing programme. 
Officials refused to publicly state the number of drone strikes authorized, the number of 
estimated casualties, or by what criteria individuals were selected for the list of targets. 
When journalists pressed the White House for such details, spokesman Ari Fleischer 
stonewalled: “There are going to be things that are done that the American people may 
never know about”.123 It similarly rebuffed international enquiries. Letters from advocacy 
groups, including Amnesty International, requesting clarification of such strikes’ legal basis 
simply went unanswered.124 Published strategic documents contained no mention of either 
targeted killings or drone strikes. Officially, for all externally-facing purposes, the targeted 
killing programme simply did not exist.  
 
As noted earlier, one motive for this secrecy was diplomatic.  Permission from the Pakistani 
and Yemeni governments for US strikes on their territory was predicated on an American 
commitment not publicly claim them. As awareness of the strikes widened through media 
reporting, however, the utility of secrecy as a tool for deflecting awkward questions became 
apparent. The US had previously condemned the Israeli policy of targeted killing, but how 
did this new US programme differ? The administration had no credible answer ready for 
public consumption. Privately, however, administration officials would admit the US policy 
rested on the same legal rationale as Israel’s,125 the difference being only of “scale and 
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frequency”.126 Anonymous officials occasionally offered indirect assurances that the process 
for selecting targets and carrying out strikes was careful: “We have more lawyers than 
Predator pilots,” one was quoted saying.127 But no outsider had access, via any official route, 
to the information required to evaluate such claims. With such opacity at the official level, 
Strawser128 argues, each strike “might as well be considered an assassination or just plain 
murder”.  
 
 
 
5. The Obama administration: quasi-secrecy and normalization 
 
5.1  Inheriting and expanding targeted killing 
 
On taking office, President Obama quietly inherited the secret targeted killing programme 
without public statement. On December 9, 2008, CIA Director Michael Hayden briefed the 
president-elect on all classified missions run by the agency, “the nature of those actions, 
and the written findings from Bush and other presidents”.129 Four days before his 
inauguration, Obama met the outgoing president, who advised him that the drone strike 
programme was one of two he would find most valuable (the other was preparation for a 
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cyber-attack on Iran’s nuclear programme).130 The appeal of targeted strikes for Obama can 
be readily understood in light of his positions as a candidate. He had been highly critical of 
large, costly military deployments such as that in Iraq. He had promised to make the US 
military “more stealthy, agile, and lethal in its ability to capture or kill terrorists”.131 He had 
also promised action in Pakistan: “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value 
terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.”132  
 
The new administration almost immediately increased the frequency of drone strikes. Three 
days after Obama’s inauguration, the CIA carried out a targeted strike inside Pakistan. This 
hit the wrong target, resulting in “a tense back-and-forth over the CIA’s vetting procedures 
for drone attacks” between the President and CIA Director Michael Hayden.133 But despite 
this, “there was no serious disagreement with the decision to continue the program.”134 
Less than a month later, the CIA launched another attack, targeting Pakistani Taliban leader 
Baitullah Mehsud, which killed more than 30 people.135 President Obama ended his first 
year having authorized 52 strikes, more than Bush had in eight years.136 Those killed 
included high-value militants, such as Mehsud, Osama bin Laden’s oldest son Saad bin 
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Laden, and Tahir Yuldashev, leader of the al-Qaeda-associated Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan.137 
 
The following year, the number of strikes doubled, to 128.138 CIA requests for wider zones of 
permitted targeting in Pakistan and more armed UAVs were approved.139 This information 
was not released publicly; the programme remained shrouded in official secrecy. Public 
records were instead compiled by outsiders, such the New America Foundation (NAF) and 
the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), counting and detailing drone strikes to the best 
of their abilities using information gleaned from other sources.140 By the end of Obama’s 
two terms in office, the BIJ’s numbers suggested he had authorized a total of 563 strikes in 
Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.141 NAF estimated 355 strikes carried out in Pakistan, with 
between 1,933 and 3,095 estimated killed, 129 to 162 thought to be civilians.142  
 
In addition to being more capable of carrying out targeted killings thanks to drone 
technology, the Obama administration had a further incentive. Obama had criticised both 
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extrajudicial detention and ‘enhanced interrogation’, i.e. torture, as practiced by the Bush 
administration. Targeted killing could obviate the need for either, while still acting to 
neutralise the perceived threat. Hayden, who concluded his tenure as CIA Director in 
February 2009, believed this partly motivated the incoming administration’s enthusiasm for 
the programme.143  Likewise former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, who judged that the 
administration “never came out and said they would start killing people because they 
couldn’t interrogate them, but the implication was unmistakable’. 144 We might also surmise 
that an increase in the number of drones deployed, and advance in their technological 
capacities boosted US capacity to identify new targets, without the need for detention and 
interrogation to provide intelligence on the identity and location of hostile actors. 
 
 
 
5.2 From secrecy to quasi-secrecy: selective disclosure and strategic leaks 
 
During its first years, the Obama administration maintained its predecessor’s approach to 
secrecy, keeping the targeted killing program tightly under wraps. Following the first strike 
of the Obama presidency, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs refused to officially 
acknowledge the event, saying only: “I'm not going to get into these matters”.145 This would 
become a routine response.  During this period, the rule book for targeted strikes was 
                                                          
143
 Interview with Hayden, 2016 
144
 Mazzetti, 2013, p.281 
145
 Jeffrey Smith, Candace Rondeaux, and Joby Warrick, “2 U.S. Airstrikes Offer a Concrete Sign of Obama's Pakistan Policy,” 
January 24, 2009, Washington Post, Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2009/01/23/AR2009012304189.html 
 
 
considered so highly classified it was “hand-carried from office to office rather than sent by 
e-mail”.146 “We didn’t even know if we were allowed to write the word ‘drone’ in an 
unclassified e-mail,” one State Department official reported.147 After leaving office, Gibbs 
revealed that “when I went through the process of becoming press secretary, one of the 
first things they told me was: “You are not even to acknowledge the drone program. You’re 
not even to discuss that it exists.”148  
 
Behind the wall of official silence, there was disagreement on the merits of such strict 
secrecy,149 especially as the increasing frequency of operations made public reportage of 
strikes inevitable. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton privately complained that blanket denial 
made it impossible to rebut exaggerated accusations about civilian casualties.150 Leon 
Panetta, who oversaw the programme for years as CIA Director, confirmed later that some 
officials advocated “full public explanation of each operation,” and that he also felt 
President Obama should be “far more transparent” in explaining the policy.151  
 
With time, however, secrecy came into tension with another imperative: securing credit for 
waging an effective counterterrorism campaign. This led to numerous instances where 
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officials sought walked the line of publicly praising the programme’s effectiveness while 
simultaneously refusing to directly acknowledge its existence. Two months into the Obama 
drone campaign, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen was asked in an 
interview about the apparent increase in strikes under the new president. He declined to 
confirm details, but stated that threats in Pakistan “need to be addressed, have been 
addressed, and will continue to be addressed”.152 In similar fashion, John Brennan, then 
deputy National Security Advisor for counterterrorism, refused to directly address the 
programme but offered the assurance that all counterterrorism operations were ‘legal,’ 
‘highly effective’, and ‘very focused’.153 CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano refused to 
acknowledge targeted killings, stating only that tools used by the agency were 
“exceptionally accurate, precise and effective”.154 CIA Director Panetta, questioned at the 
Pacific Council in 2009, adopted a similar approach: “Obviously because these are covert 
and secret operations I can’t go into particulars. I think it does suffice to say that these 
operations have been very effective because they have been very precise in terms of the 
targeting and it involved a minimum of collateral damage”.155 In another interview, he 
praised the CIA’s counterterrorist efforts as the “most aggressive” in history, yet stopped 
short of stating what methods exactly he was referring to.156  
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Most controversially, the administration further engineered favourable coverage by means 
of anonymous leaks to the media. In 2011, David Ignatius of the Washington Post reported 
that the White House was willing to discuss the top-secret drone campaign with him, but 
only when resulting coverage promoted the precise and effective nature of the 
programme.157 “These rules about covert activities can be bent when it becomes politically 
advantageous,” he explained. Jonathan Landay of Reuters reported a similar experience, 
noting that when information worked in administration’s favour, “you get quite a detailed 
readout”.158 Leaks such as these allowed officials to advance, for public consumption, 
information carefully selected to portray the efficacy and legality of the programme in the 
most favourable possible light.  Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial 
executions, maintains that leaks “played a powerful role in legitimizing the targeted killings 
program”.159 Meanwhile the regime of official secrecy retained in parallel provided a 
protective barrier behind which officials could step at any moment of their choosing. This 
was especially useful when faced with the most difficult questions arising from targeted 
killing, such as the outer limit of the legal authority to kill claimed by the executive, or the 
details of targeted strikes gone awry. In this way, the antagonistic incentives for secrecy and 
disclosure faced by the administration interacted such that the programme became, as 
Mark Phythian has observed, “neither fully covert nor overt”.160  
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5.3 The gradual, partial official ‘opening up’  
 
In 2010, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, presented an assessment to the 
American Society of International Law, a few paragraphs long, of how targeted killings could 
fall within the laws of war.161 Prior to the speech, he had resisted engaging publicly with 
legal debates on the subject.162 An administration lawyer later stated that Koh’s public 
defence was the end result of an “unbelievably excruciating process of crafting a public 
statement that all the agencies can agree on”.163 The UN’s Philip Alston welcomed the 
statement as “a good start,” but noted that his agency had “been asking for a legal rationale 
for quite a long time” and Koh’s statement failed to answer key legal questions.164  
 
2011 was an inflection point in intensifying pressure on the administration to account in 
some on-the-record way for the programme and its legal basis. This was because it 
contained perhaps the two highest-profile killings to occur during the Obama presidency. 
First, on May 2, Osama bin Laden, for whose location the US had been hunting since before 
9/11, was killed by a Navy SEAL helicopter raid on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, to 
which he had finally been traced. This was not a typical instalment in the targeted killing 
programme as we have defined it here, for two reasons. First, it was carried out under the 
command of the US military rather than by intelligence operatives or contractors (though of 
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course the CIA was intimately involved). Second, it was immediately announced by the 
President as a major success and reported in detail by the press, with government 
assistance. Though obviously planned secretly, it was not a covert operation, in that there 
was no intention to maintain deniability after it had been carried out. Nevertheless, after 
the initial wave of celebratory reaction, the raid did give rise to pointed questions regarding 
the legal basis for bin Laden’s apparent summary execution.165 The administration generally 
avoided addressing the point, though Attorney General Eric Holder, who found himself 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 4, responded under questioning that “the 
operation in which Osama bin Laden was killed was lawful. He was the head of al Qaeda, an 
organization that had conducted the attacks of September 11. He admitted his 
involvement… It was justified as an act of national self-defense.”166 The Bin Laden execution 
thus drew unprecedented attention to some of the key underlying legal issues pertaining to 
the CIA drone strike programme. But at the same time the ad hoc, one-off nature of the 
Abbottabad raid and the singularly high public profile of the target, not to mention the 
direct connection to 9/11, gave the Bin Laden killing a sui generis quality.  
 
The next substantive public articulation of justification for the broader programme from the 
administration came at Harvard on Sep 16, 2011, when counterterrorism advisor John 
Brennan offered a defence for killing beyond ‘hot’ battlefields based on an expansive 
understanding of ‘imminence’ of threat.167 He disclosed no operational facts not already in 
the public domain, but in combination with Koh’s prior statement, Brennan’s remarks began 
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in earnest the process of presenting, on the record, an official legal and normative case for 
what the executive had been doing for the past decade. At the time of these limited steps, 
however, official secrecy regarding the very existence of the programme to which this legal 
reasoning pertained remained in place, leading to a degree of self-conscious absurdity. 
Asked directly “Does the CIA have a drone program?”, Brennan refused to plainly 
acknowledge it, replying jokingly: “If the agency did have such a program, I’m sure it would 
be done with the utmost care, precision…”.168 The New York Times report of the event 
records that the conclusion of Brennan’s sentence “was garbled by the laughter of the 
audience.” 
 
Brennan’s speech came just 14 days before the second landmark targeted killing in 2011, 
that of Anwar al-Awlaki, by CIA drone strike in Yemen, on Sep 30. This placed further strain 
upon secrecy for two reasons. First, because the president was eager to publicly claim al-
Awlaki’s elimination as a counterterrorism success.169 Second, because he was American-
born, and this raised the constitutional stakes regarding the executive’s asserted right to 
target and kill.  
 
McKelvey (2013) notes a surge in press scrutiny from mid-2011 onward:  
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[From] July 2011 to July 2012, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the 
Christian Science Monitor published roughly 120 articles, or more than four times the 
number of articles from a comparable period in the previous twelve months, that 
looked at legal aspects of the drone program. In addition, these newspapers 
published 33 articles that looked at moral aspects of the program, more than three 
times the number of articles during the previous twelve-month-long period.170  
 
Responding to this pressure, Brennan addressed an audience at the Wilson Center in 2012, 
and finally unequivocally admitted: “Yes, in full accordance with the law, and in order to 
prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives, the United States 
Government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qaida terrorists”.171 He further 
noted that he was speaking following an instruction from President Obama “to be more 
open with the American people about these efforts”,172 and proceeded to set out elements 
of its underlying legal basis. Brennan’s speech was a landmark moment in the 
administration’s public handling of the program. Soon after, several high-level officials, 
including Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson,173 Attorney General Eric Holder,174 
and CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston175 followed suit by engaging in public defence of 
administration’s use of drones. Finally, in 2013, the president himself delivered a speech at 
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the National Defense University seeking to clarify the administration’s approach to 
counterterrorism, especially with regard to targeted drone strikes.176 
 
In these public statements aimed at legitimating the programme, arguments put forward 
included: the ‘state of exception’ created by a new type of terrorist threat; the 
unconventional nature of terrorists as non-uniformed armed combatants; the inaccessible 
locations of those targeted, which put them beyond the reach of capture or law 
enforcement; the US Government’s duty to prioritise the lives of the American population; 
the high risk of imminent attack if the US did not act; the precision of the technology now 
available for targeting; and the seriousness and professionalism with which the president 
and other officials undertook the responsibility of targeting.  
 
With regard to the norm against assassination, the administration fell somewhere, to use 
Keating’s terminology (see section 2), between offering justification and advocating 
innovation. “Assassination”, administration officials said, was “repugnant”, “unlawful”, and 
not something that the US practiced or supported.177 But these killings were not 
assassinations. “The use of that loaded term is misplaced,” said Attorney General Eric 
Holder.178  In his speech, Homeland Security Secretary Johnson (2012) directly addressed 
the relevant history, contending that there was a substantial difference between the US 
government assassination plots of the 1970s and present practice. “Lethal force against a 
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valid military objective, in an armed conflict is consistent with the law of war,” he noted, 
asserting that the current strikes qualified as such.179  
 
Key to the administration’s justification was the expansive definition of ‘imminence’.  As 
noted earlier, this was first sketched officially and publicly by Brennan in his 2011 Harvard 
speech: 
 
We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more 
flexible understanding of ‘imminence’ may be appropriate when dealing with 
terrorist groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present 
themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts[...] 
Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have 
begun to recognize that the traditional conception of what constitutes an ‘imminent’ 
attack should be broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and 
technological innovations of terrorist organizations”.180 
 
Brennan was to put it mildly, putting a positive spin the matter of world opinion. Former CIA 
Director Michael Hayden, intimately involved in the drone programme during the Bush 
years, was more frank: “there isn’t a government on the planet that agrees with our legal 
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rationale for these operations, except for Afghanistan and maybe Israel”.181 Nevertheless, 
this position was codified in a Justice Department memo stating that:  
 
The condition that an operational leader present an 'imminent' threat of violent 
attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear 
evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the 
immediate future [...] By its nature…the threat posed by Al Qaeda and its associated 
forces demands a broader concept of imminence…182  
 
 
5.4 Resisting scrutiny and oversight: the limits of openness  
 
Throughout the Obama administration’s time in office, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) struggled persistently, using the Freedom of Information Act, for greater 
transparency regarding targeted killing operations and their legal basis. The White House, in 
response, fought tenaciously to withhold documents and information. In 2010, the ACLU 
opened its first lawsuit, asking for “disclosure of the legal basis, scope, and limits on the 
targeted killing program”.183 In 2012, three additional cases were filed: a lawsuit challenging 
the killing of al-Awlaki; an information request about 2012 targeted killings in Yemen; and 
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an additional request to disclose information about a drone strike in the al-Majalah region in 
Yemen.184 Aside from one minor ACLU victory in 2013185, the executive generally succeeded 
in resisting such demands for disclosure. 
 
The administration also successfully minimised the role of Congress. In 2012, 26 
Congressmen signed a request for greater transparency, arguing that targeted killings 
carried major implications for the United States and the public had the right to know what 
was being done in their name.186 When such requests failed to produce results, members of 
Congress used confirmation hearings as a forum to press for more information. In 2011, the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committee held a hearing on the nomination of General David 
Petraeus to be CIA Director. Roy Blunt, Republican of Missouri, used the occasion to press 
the general for details on targeted killings by drones. In response, Petraeus carefully and 
cannily focused on drone operations in Afghanistan, where such missions operated in an 
entirely different legal context from those in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. In so doing, he 
highlighted only the positives: “I would note that the experience of the military with 
unmanned aerial vehicles is that the precision is quite impressive, that there is a very low 
incidence of civilian casualties in the course of such operations”.187 
 
In 2013 the committee pressed Brennan, Obama’s nominee to replace Petraeus, harder 
about programme, since in his previous role he had been one of its chief architects. In his 
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opening statement, he noted that there was a “widespread debate” within the 
administration about counterterrorism, and that policymakers “wrestled with” lethal 
operations, but at the same time he defended the practice by pointing out that the US was 
at war with al-Qaeda.188 Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon complained that the committee had 
never seen a full list of countries in which the CIA carried out lethal operations.189 Further, it 
had seen only “two of an estimated 11 legal opinions” on the programme.190 The hearing as 
a whole served to expose just how little information Congress had, prompting Committee 
Chair Diane Feinstein to tell reporters afterwards: “I think that this has gone about as far as 
it can go as a covert activity”.191  
 
In November 2013, the Committee voted by 13-2 to require the CIA to reveal how many 
individuals it believed to have been killed or injured in its strikes.192 By April 2014, however, 
this was thwarted when the Senate as a whole removed this specific demand from the 
relevant bill. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper led administration lobbying 
against the requirement by arguing that: “To be meaningful to the public, any report 
including the information described above would require context and to be drafted carefully 
so as to protect against the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods or other 
classified information”.193 Official numerical data regarding strikes and casualties would not 
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ultimately be released by the administration until July 2016, and the figures provided then 
were markedly lower than those compiled by outside organisations. This led the New York 
Times among others to complain that they “answer few questions, and raise many”.194 
 
The administration was similarly resistant to disclosure of its detailed legal reasoning. It only 
shared with Congress the memos providing its legal rationale for targeted killing of al-Awlaki 
when one of its co-authors, David Jeremiah Barron, had his nomination for the 1st US Circuit 
Court of Appeals blocked until the administration yielded. It then “allowed lawmakers from 
a secure room in the Senate, to view copies of two memos written by Barron”.195 The 
administration declined to share them with the press or public. In 2016 a Stimson Center 
report accused the administration of “obstructing efforts to develop greater oversight and 
accountability mechanisms and reinforcing the administration’s culture of secrecy 
surrounding the use of armed drones”.196  
 
 
6. The normalisation of targeted killing 
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The preceding sections have demonstrated that a substantial shift in government practice 
took place during the Bush and Obama presidencies. A category of killing that had been 
treated as forbidden between 1976 and 2001 became routine practice. This occurred first in 
secret, then became more widely known under the Obama administration, as the scale of 
the killing programme increased.  
 
A shift of this kind had self-evident potential to generate controversy and opposition. We 
know, however, that the Obama administration was ultimately successful in securing and 
maintaining public support for its actions.  A 2012 Washington Post poll found 83 percent 
support for Obama’s targeted killing policy.197 A year later, a different survey taken by 
Gallup showed that almost two-thirds of Americans (65 percent) approved of the 
government striking individual targets in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.198 While there were 
fluctuations over subsequent years, majority support was consistent.199 This was true 
among both Republicans and Democrats, and held even when respondents were prompted 
to consider strikes against American citizens living overseas, or reminded of the distinction 
between drone strokes carried out by the CIA as opposed to the US military.200 The 
reasonable conclusion from this is that public acceptance of the practice was by this time 
active, not merely premised on ignorance. Organisations dedicated to civil liberties, such as 
the ACLU, of course continued to object strongly. But notwithstanding this, the executive 
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was also successful in obtaining consent from the overwhelming bulk of the political elite 
and governmental institutions. Congress, regardless of majority party, took no meaningful 
steps to obstruct the policy. Neither did the courts.   
 
Support within the relevant executive agencies was not unanimous. Elliot Ackerman, a CIA 
officer during the Obama administration, notes the presence of internal dissent, even when 
official lawyers had carefully articulated for internal purposes a distinction between 
‘targeted killing’ and ‘assassination’ and blessed the legality of the former. “The discomfort 
of my colleagues, where it existed, didn’t stem from the act itself [...] The discomfort existed 
because it felt like we were doing something, on a large scale, that we’d sworn not to. Most 
of us felt as though we were violating Executive Order 12333 [the ban on assassination]. 
Everybody knew what was happening – senior intelligence officials, general officers, the 
administration, even the American people, who ostensibly would not tolerate assassinations 
carried out in their name”.201 Similarly, Cameron Munter, Obama’s Ambassador to Pakistan, 
resigned from his post, complaining privately that “he didn't realise his main job was to kill 
people”.202 Yet such objections were marginalised, and could not obstruct the programme’s 
operation. 
 
A major indicator of how fully the practice was normalised was the extent to which the 
targeted killing programme altered the structures and activities of the CIA itself. Locating 
                                                          
201
 Elliot Ackerman, “Assassination and the American Language,” New Yorker, November 20, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/assassination-american-language 
202
 Clive Stafford Smith, “We are sleepwalking into the Drone Age, unaware of the consequences,” Guardian, June 2, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/02/drone-age-obama- pakistan 
 
 
and targeting militants on a global basis became the agency’s primary task.203 “We went 
from a purely espionage organization to more of an offensive weapon, a paramilitary 
organization where classic spying was less important,” a senior officer explained.204 From 
having 300 employees before 9/11, the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center grew to 2,000.205 
Mazzetti estimates that more than half of those joining the agency after 9/11 era focused 
exclusively on manhunt and targeted killing operations. 206  While Obama did not initiate this 
institutional shift, he did accelerate it, propelled by technological advance. Under his 
authority, the CIA modernized Bush-era targeting practices, turning the ‘kill list’ into a more 
sophisticated, constantly-updated database in which “biographies, locations, known 
associates and affiliated organizations” were catalogued.207 Updating the target list became 
a routinized bureaucratic process, with more than 100 members of the national security 
apparatus vetting whom should be targeted and where.208 Targeted killings were no longer 
exceptional or rare. On the contrary, they were routine, and administered systematically.209  
 
The administration could have sought legitimacy for this shift at the outset through, in 
Keating’s terminology, either overt justification or innovation: that is, through open and 
active advocacy for the proposition that targeted killing was compatible with established 
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norms, or else that those norms should be updated to render it permissible. Alternatively, it 
could have sought to keep the killings secret, thus evading the need for legitimation and the 
risk of failure and backlash entailed in seeking it.  
 
The case detail we have presented here makes it clear that in practice the administration 
declined to make a straight choice between these alternatives, pursuing instead a hybrid 
path to legitimation via ‘quasi-secrecy’. That is: it maintained a formal regime of official 
secrecy, but combined it with the simultaneous, often unofficial, release to the public of 
limited information designed to portray the efficacy and legality of the programme in the 
most favourable possible light. Such disclosures served to allow the public to become 
accustomed over time to the existence of targeted killing as a government practice, and this 
contributed to the goal of normalizing the executive’s actions in the eyes of key domestic 
audiences. At the same time, official secrecy relieved officials of the need to publicly 
address inconvenient or unpleasant facts arising from operations, or tackle the ultimate 
logical implications of the programme’s underpinning legal reasoning and locate definitively 
the outer limits of the executive’s prerogative to kill. 
 
The administration’s success in all this suggests we should consider secrecy not as a binary – 
and, as some have argued, temporary and counterproductive – alternative to legitimation. 
Rather, blended with selective disclosure in a strategy of quasi-secrecy, it can be part of a 
highly effective mechanism for normalising potentially controversial innovation.  By the time 
the Obama administration finally officially avowed the targeted killing programme, 
articulated its legal basis, and began to present an overt case in support of its legitimacy, the 
 
 
core operational facts of the programme had been de facto publicly known, and painted in a 
positive light, for years. Consequently, its ultimate, belated official acknowledgement was 
received by the public not as the shocking announcement of a highly controversial 
innovation, but merely as confirmation of a long-established government practice, the legal 
and normative merits of which a reasonable but non-expert observer might suppose had 
already long since been debated and settled.  
 
The ‘moment’ at which, in an overt-advocacy-centred model of legitimation, targeted killing 
should have been pitched to the public as a major but desirable shift in practice meriting 
serious consideration simply never occurred. At the time when the shift in practice took 
place and became de facto publicly known, and for many years thereafter, the executive’s 
position was that official secrecy prevented officials from debating its merits, or even frankly 
acknowledging its existence. By the time the administration was prepared to officially avow 
the operational facts of its actions and the legal reasoning underlying them – a sine qua non 
for meaningful debate – they had ceased to seem sufficiently novel to generate what 
energetic public engagement they once might have. To the observer’s eye, targeted killing 
appeared to move directly from ‘outside the bounds of official discussion’, to 
‘uncontroversial long-established practice’ with no way-stations in between. It was for years 
apparently not yet the right time to litigate openly the merits of the policy, until all at once 
it was too late. The utility of quasi-secrecy lies precisely in facilitating this move: it advances 
the goal of legitimation by cultivating a widespread impression that open debate, resulting 
in consent, must surely have occurred at an earlier moment, while in fact serving to avert its 
occurrence at any point. In this way, even a norm of substantial weight may be killed 
 
 
sufficiently softly that the precise moment of its passing fails to register. The ethical and 
political virtues of such a strategy are – clearly – open to question. This case, however, 
provides proof of concept for its efficacy. This will no doubt be of interest to government 
officials interested in adopting and legitimating controversial new practices. Those who 
identify more with the audience than with the executive branch in this story, however, may 
consider it a warning of manoeuvres for which they should remain vigilant.   
